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ABSTRACT
This paper employs a simple intertemporal model to show that presence of liquidity constraints can
depress the price of a durable good below its net present rental value, regardless of the overall
supply elasticity. The existence of price effects implies that the relaxation of liquidity constraints
is not Pareto improving, and may in fact be regressive. Historical evidence, which exploits the fact
that a clearly identifiable group, war veterans, enjoyed the most favored access to mortgage credit
in the postwar era, supports the model. The results suggest that more recent mortgage market
innovations have served primarily to increase prices rather than home ownership rates, and that such








In the United States, few policy goals inspire less political controversy than the promotion
of home ownership.  Both Democratic and Republican administrations have cited increased home
ownership rates as an important priority, and have pointed towards recent increases in this rate as
an accomplishment. Since the Great Depression, government efforts to ease the path to home
ownership have focused on generating greater and more widespread access to credit markets.  Such
efforts, described in detail in Section II below, concord with a view that liquidity constraints prevent
many households from engaging in socially preferred behavior.
In recent economic literature, the role of liquidity constraints in altering behavior is a matter
of some debate. A number of articles, both examining housing tenure (Duca and Rosenthal 1994;
Gyourko et al. 1999; Haurin et al. 1997; Linneman et al. 1997; Linneman and Wachter 1989;
Listokin et al. 2001; Rosenthal, 2002; Zorn 1989) and more general consumption patterns (Hayashi,
1985; Chah, Ramey, and Starr, 1995; Stepens, 2002) support the hypothesis that consumer behavior
changes in the presence of borrowing constraints.  Borrowing constraints have frequently been
implicated as an explanation for empirical failures of the life-cycle and permanent income
hypotheses (see Deaton, 1992, for a thorough review).  On the other hand, several prominent papers
have challenged the notion that liquidity constraints strongly influence behavior (Carneiro and
Heckman 2002; Cameron and Taber 2004; Hurst and Lusardi 2004).  Households facing liquidity
constraints differ in many respects from unconstrained households, and it is these other differences
that may truly explain differences in observed behavior.  If this is the case, then relaxing liquidity
constraints would have little or no impact on equilibrium consumption or investment patterns.
This paper focuses on a second reason why the relaxation of liquidity constraints may have2
limited impact on behavior: because greater access to credit has the potential to raise the equilibrium
price of durable goods.  Price effects may explain, for example, why numerous mortgage market
innovations over the past twenty years have had only a negligible impact on home ownership rates.
The possibility that liquidity constraints depress prices has been raised in previous theoretical
literature (Ranney 1981; Stein 1995; Ortalo-Magne and Rady 2002).  Empirical studies, however,
often ignore the potential for price effects or assume that any such effects are negligible.
Does the relaxation of borrowing constraints lead to higher prices for assets and durable
goods?  Is this effect large enough to be empirically relevant?  Existing literature is largely mute on
these questions; this paper provides answers to each of them.
This study extends the existing theoretical literature on liquidity constraints and prices by
debunking the primary argument of those who claim that price effects are negligible: that highly
elastic long-run supply curves limit the potential for demand increases to translate into price
increases.  A very simple intertemporal model, inspired by existing models of tenure choice in the
housing market (Artle and Varaiya, 1978; Brueckner, 1986; Henderson and Ioannides, 1983; Stein
1995), shows that borrowing constraint relaxation can make asset values rise relative to the present
discounted value of rents even when supply is perfectly elastic.
This study also presents an empirical analysis of liquidity constraints and prices that
examines both time-series evidence on the relation of housing values to rents and cross-sectional
variation generated by a large government program that selectively relaxed borrowing constraints
for a clearly identifiable subset of the population: the VA mortgage program.  The evidence suggests
that mortgage market innovations contributed to a remarkable rise in housing values relative to rents
between 1940 and the present.  In particular, the ratio of housing values to rents displays sensitivity1 Economists may be skeptical of the importance of home ownership as an indicator of well-being, relative
to measures such as household income or consumption.  Interest in home ownership can be justified on the grounds
that consumers are myopic and need to employ commitment devices in order to accumulate assets (Laibson 1997).
There is also evidence that housing tenure decisions have nonmarket implications for child and family development
(Boehm and Schlottmann, 1997; Green and White 1997) and citizenship (DiPasquale and Glaeser 1997; see Rohe et
al. 2002 for a literature review).  Finally, public economists take interest in home ownership because of the income
tax treatment of mortgage payments and other policy initiatives (Engelhardt, 1997; Follain et al. 1987; Poterba,
1992; Poterba 1984; see Hendershott and White 2000 for a literature review).  See Collins and Margo (2001) and
Masnick (2001) for analysis of home ownership patterns in the U.S. across the twentieth century.
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to the share of veterans in the market in the time period when the VA mortgage program had the
greatest impact on home ownership rates.  Section II below provides basic information on the
evolution of housing prices in this era; following the theoretical discussion in section III, section IV
presents time-series evidence and section V analyzes the implications of the VA mortgage program.
The existence of price effects implies that the relaxation of borrowing constraints, though
welfare improving by Hicks-Kaldor criteria, is not Pareto improving.  If easier credit creates winners
and losers, how might we most accurately characterize consumers who gain and those who suffer?
While section III discusses this question in theory, section VI presents empirical evidence to suggest
that households of low socioeconomic status benefit least from innovations in the credit market.
Given the billions of dollars spent on improving access to mortgage markets and otherwise
subsidizing home ownership in the United States, the distributional implications of promoting easy
access to credit should be widely noted.
II. Motivating evidence: housing prices, the mortgage market, and home ownership
The mid-twentieth century witnessed a profound change in both home ownership patterns
and the relationship between asset prices and rental rates in the housing market.
1  As Table 1
indicates, the  home ownership rate in the U.S. increased by nearly 50% between 1940 and 1960.
After 1960, ownership rates continued to increase, but at a markedly slower rate.  Table 1 also shows2 It is not possible to pinpoint the exact ratio after 1940 because housing value data are intervalled.  Census
data on housing prices and rents are not available prior to 1940.
3 The sample of owner-occupied units used to construct these statistics consists of nonfarm, non-
condominium occupied single family units with no commercial uses, on lots of less than ten acres.  In 1940, it is not
possible to distinguish multifamily units or units with commercial units, however respondents were instructed in that
year to omit the value of units they did not occupy or commercial space when providing their estimate of market
value.
4 Figure 1 also shows that the price of owner-occupied housing fell relative to the price of other consumer
goods during World War II.  This may reflect the wartime rationing of goods other than owner-occupied housing.
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that this marked increase in home ownership was accompanied by a substantial increase in the price
of the typical owner occupied housing unit, relative to the cost of the typical rental unit.  In 1940,
the median owner-occupied housing unit was worth roughly 140 times median monthly rent.  By
1960, this ratio had increased to at least 180.
2  The ratio has remained at or above this general level
since, with some evidence of further increases in recent decades.
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This escalation, while impressive, may reflect changes in the physical characteristics of
owner- and renter-occupied units over time.  A measure of constant-quality owner-occupied housing
prices can be obtained from the National Income and Product Accounts beginning in 1929.  Figure
1 plots this price index, converted to a logarithmic scale, along with the corresponding price index
for all personal consumption expenditures.  Both indices have been normalized to a value of zero
in 1947.  This graph shows that over the postwar period, constant-quality housing values have
tracked overall price levels fairly closely, with two noteworthy exceptions.  Housing prices
accelerated above inflation in the immediate postwar era and remained relatively higher than the
prices of other consumer goods until the mid-1970s.
4  This pattern corroborates the acceleration of
owner-occupied housing values displayed in Table 1.  In the late 1970s, housing prices tracked
general price levels quite closely, in spite of Beginning in 1982, housing prices began another period5 Interestingly, these time series indicate that the period of rapid home price acceleration in the 1970s,
analyzed by Mankiw and Weil (1989) and many subsequent researchers, can be viewed as a simple manifestation of
overall price level increases or increases in housing unit quality over the same time period.
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of acceleration.
5  This acceleration has persisted to the present day.
These two periods of housing price escalation coincide with major relaxations in borrowing
constraints, as seen in the timeline of major mortgage market innovations presented in Table 2
(Jackson, 1985; Bruskin et al. 2000; Listokin et al. 2001; Martinez 2000).  At the onset of the Great
Depression, when the time series graph in Figure 1 begins, families interested in purchasing a home
generally were expected to make a down payment of at least 30% of the home’s value.  The loan
they received would not be fully amortized, requiring a balloon payment (or refinancing) after five
to ten years.  During the depression, a large number of households defaulted on their mortgage
payments, leading to foreclosure in many cases.  Over an eleven-year period beginning in 1933,
government innovations, including the creation of the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) and
Veterans’ Administration (VA) mortgage insurance programs, and the establishment of a secondary
market for mortgage debt, radically changed the nature of the mortgage market.  By 1944, it was
possible for many households to receive a fully amortized, twenty to thirty-year mortgage with down
payments of 10% or less.  The VA mortgage program was the most generous of those introduced
during this time period, since it enabled eligible veterans to purchase a home with no down payment
whatsoever and no mortgage insurance premium.  As with the FHA program, the Federal
government insured lenders against default risk.
The impact of these innovations on home ownership rates and housing prices was somewhat
delayed by depression and war.  Ownership rates reached a local minimum in the 1940 Census, and
Figure 1 shows that housing prices continued to sink relative to other consumer goods until the end6
of World War II.  The coincidence of rapidly increasing ownership rates and housing prices in the
postwar era suggests an important role for relaxed liquidity constraints.
The second period of escalating relative house prices, beginning around 1982, coincides with
further innovations in the mortgage market.  Until the 1980s the secondary mortgage market, which
encouraged lending by pooling the risk that individual financial institutions assumed when extending
credit, was an avenue open only for loans that “conformed” to underwriting standards governing
borrower creditworthiness and property characteristics.  A secondary market for “non-conforming”
loans, mortgages that entities such as the Federal National Mortgage Association (FNMA) refused
to securitize, grew rapidly through the 1980s and into the 1990s.  The definition of “conforming”
loans was itself relaxed in response to Federal legislation in 1992.  By 1994, lenders had initialized
programs that allowed qualified households to borrow more than the value of a home, effectively
creating a negative down payment that could be applied towards closing costs or received in cash.
These innovations enabled some previously ineligible households to purchase a home, and provided
many others with increased buying power given current wealth levels (Bruskin et al., 2000).  As
Table 1 indicates, these new mortgage market innovations are not associated with any appreciable
change in home ownership rates.  They do, however, coincide with the current period of relatively
high prices for owner-occupied housing, as shown in Figure 1.
Could factors other than credit market innovations explain these broad trends?  Fluctuations
in real interest rates undoubtedly influence the ratio of housing prices to rents; however the trends
identified in this section are of too broad a period to be explained by cyclical variation.  Changes
in the value of the tax subsidy for mortgage interest, which has been in place since 1913, might also
be expected to influence housing prices (Poterba, 1984).  Note, however, that housing prices failed6 In an appendix, Stein (1995) incorporates a rental market, but requires that renters pay an arbirtrary
premium relative to owner-occupied housing prices.  This model can also generate such a premium as a result of
liquidity constraints, rather than by assumption.
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to accelerate ahead of inflation during the “bracket creep” era of the late 1970s and 1980s.  Prices
did accelerate, however, during the latter part of the 1980s, a time of broad declines in marginal tax
rates.
III. Tenure choice, liquidity constraints, and prices: a simple model
There have been several noteworthy theoretical studies of housing prices and more generally
of housing demand (Ranney, 1981; Poterba, 1984; Schwab 1982; Stein, 1995; Ortalo-Magne and
Rady 2002; see Smith et al. 1988 for a review of housing market models).  Stein (1995), in
particular, uses a static model to show that borrowing constraints reduce housing prices. Stein’s
result can be attributed to the assumption of a fixed housing stock, and the fact that households must
pay for housing prior to consuming and earning income.  Under different assumptions, particularly
if housing supply is close to perfectly elastic, this type of model produces radically different results.
The model presented here is an advancement over Stein’s model in several respects.  It is a
two-period intertemporal model.  There is no restriction on the price elasticity of housing supply.
Finally, there is a fully integrated rental market for housing as well as a market for owner-occupied
housing.
6  The model shows that liquidity constraints can depress the price of owner-occupied
housing below the present value of rents, regardless of the local price elasticity of supply.
Agents i derive utility from two consumption goods, housing services Hi and a numeraire
commodity Xi.  They are endowed with varying amounts of a single physical asset, Ai, which can
be interpreted as land.  They are also endowed with varying amounts of effective labor, Li, which8
they supply inelastically to firms.  Competitive firms purchase labor and rent land in competitive
factor markets and transform them into the numeraire commodity.  Any quantities of land not used
in the production process in a given period can be costlessly transformed into housing services.  In
the first period, agents may buy, sell or rent land.  Only consumers may purchase land, but either
consumers or firms may rent it.  Agents’ net housing consumption in each period is Ai, less the net
amount sold   and the net amount rented to other agents  .
Using Xti to denote numeraire consumption in period t, assuming that utility is time-
separable, and that agents making decisions in the first period discount second-period utility by a
factor *, the consumer’s maximization problem can be stated as follows:
(1) ,
subject to the accounting identity
(2) .
Assuming that agents can store the numeraire commodity without risk or return between periods,
the maximization in equation (1) is undertaken subject to the lifetime budget constraint:
(3) ,
where w is the market wage, equal to the marginal product of effective labor, r equals the marginal
product of land in the production of the numeraire, and V is the endogenously determined price of
a unit of land.
Agents with asset holdings that are sufficiently small relative to their labor income will find
it desirable to borrow against their second period income.  Such borrowing is governed by the
relation:
(4) .7 Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) present a model justifying the existence of credit rationing in markets with
imperfect information.
8 This model can thus endogenously generate premiums for rental housing, observationally equivalent to
discounts for owner-occupied housing, similar to those derived by Henderson and Ioannides (1983) and imposed by
assumption in Stein (1995).
9 General equilibrium effects complicate this intuition somewhat.  In practice, the equality required by
equation (5) could be achieved either by a decrease in V or an increase in r.  Under the assumption of diminishing
marginal product, higher r implies greater labor intensity and lower equilibrium wages.  In general, lower wages will
have the effect of reducing liquidity constraints.
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In words, excess of first-period consumption over total first-period income may not exceed :i.
7  In
scenarios where borrowing is prohibited, :i=0.  Less stringent regulations on borrowing involve
some greater value of :i.
With this setup, it is quite simple to show that per-unit housing values V fall below the
present value of rents, 2r, in the presence of liquidity constraints.  Denoting the Lagrange multiplier
from the lifetime constraint (3) as 81 and the multiplier from the intertemporal constraint (4) as 82,
the first order conditions of the consumer’s problem yield the following relation between V and r:
(5) .
When the intertemporal constraint is nonbinding, this expression for V reduces to 2r, the present
value of rents.  As liquidity constraints become more binding, increasing the shadow value of first-
period assets, this expression falls further below the present value of rents.
8  Intuitively, liquidity
constraints drive consumers to sell land on the open market and consume housing by renting instead.
If the excess supply created by liquidity-constrained consumers wishing to sell land cannot be
absorbed by unconstrained consumers willing to buy, the equilibrium price must fall.
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The distributional implications of relaxing liquidity constraints are easily derived.
Consumers can be divided into two groups on the basis of their value of 82.  Initially, less-
constrained households are net purchasers of housing, and realize the benefits of depressed prices10 There is some empirical evidence to support the notion that credit access programs do not benefit the
long-term poor.  Goodman and Nichols (1997) show evidence that the FHA mortgage program primarily benefits
young households – likely those with low asset holdings in relation to present and future income – rather than poor
households.
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either by increasing their housing consumption or renting additional units of land to finance
numeraire consumption.  More-constrained households adopt the opposite strategy, selling to finance
additional numeraire consumption in the first period.  Any general relaxation of liquidity constraints
naturally yields positive benefits to net sellers of housing and negative benefits to net purchasers.
In this model, less-constrained households will tend to be those with high asset holdings
relative to income, or equivalently low income in relation to asset holdings.  It is thus difficult to
determine a priori whether the relaxation of liquidity constraints is progressive or regressive.  If
households with low income also tend to have a low ratio of income-to-assets, then easier access to
credit can actually be a regressive policy.
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Another implication of this model, which will be of importance for the empirical tests below,
is that exogenous increases in the rental rate r should increase the discount applied to V.  Intuitively,
since the net rental holdings of households are negative, a higher r increases per-period income
relative to net assets.  Any increase in per-period income relative to asset holdings will increase
households’ desire to borrow to finance first-period consumption.
It is worth reiterating that this model’s result holds without any reference to the price
elasticity of supply for housing.  In this model, the elasticity of housing supply depends on the
second derivative of firms’ production functions with respect to the physical asset.  If the marginal
product of land is constant, then the elasticity of supply for housing is infinite: increases in demand11 In this model, the housing supply elasticity can only be infinite up to a point – determined by the total
endowments of land in the economy.  Also note that increased housing demand may have a feedback effect, since
reduced utilization of land may change the marginal product of labor in production, and hence wages.
12 Several empirical studies have concluded that the price elasticity of housing supply is considerably less
than infinite (Capozza, Green and Hendershott 1996; Topel and Rosen 1988; Malpezzi and Mayo 1997).
13 Multifamily dwellings are excluded for all sample years except 1940.  In 1940, owners of multifamily
units were asked to estimate the value of their own unit only.  It is not possible to determine which housing units are
part of multifamily structures in these data.  Farms are also excluded from the analysis. 
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for housing translate entirely into changes in the quantity consumed.
11  Even when the rental price
is constant, however, liquidity constraints can influence the purchase price of housing.  Some
previous empirical studies of liquidity constraints and tenure choice dismiss the possibility of price
effects with arguments related to the supply elasticity of housing (see, for example, Monroe, 2001).
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The results presented in this section show that these arguments are insufficient to assuage concerns
that easier access to credit creates inflationary pressure in the housing market.  The following
sections present empirical evidence documenting such effects.
IV. Time Series Evidence
As shown in Table 1, the ratio of median value to median rent has increased considerably
over the past sixty years.  Table 3 presents the results of simple tests of the hypothesis that this
phenomenon reflects a gradual elimination of discounts for owner-occupied housing in high-rent
housing markets.  As illustrated above, such a pattern would be expected if consumers in these
markets experienced a reduction in liquidity constraints.
These regressions make use of Integrated Public Use Microdata Sample (IPUMS) data
collected from a series of U.S. Census enumerations beginning in 1940.  The unit of observation in
each specification is an owner-occupied housing unit.
13  The dependent variable in each specification14 Previous research has shown that owners tend to overestimate their property’s true market value, but
estimation errors appear to be random (Goodman and Ittner, 1992).  The 1940 value data are coded at the dollar
level; the 1970 value data are intervalled.
15 Since the independent variable of interest is a sample statistic, each observation in the regression is
weighted by the square root of the sample size used in calculating the statistic, in order to avoid heteroskedasticity
problems.  Unweighted regressions yield similar results, though ln(rent) coefficients in both 1940 and 1970 are
smaller in absolute value, as should be expected when noisier observations are given greater weight in the
regression.
16 Although the unit of observation in these regressions is an owner-occupied housing unit, the number of
independent observations is effectively restricted to the number of MSAs in each year.  For this reason, the Huber-
White correction has been applied to the standard errors in these regressions.
17 In an infinite-horizon model without liquidity constraints, V = r/*.  Taking logs, we find ln(V) = ln(r) -
ln(*).  The intercept of this regression can thus be interpreted as the negative value of the logarithm of the rate of
return used to compute housing values. The parameter estimates in Table 4 yield annual rates of return on the order
of 6.8 to 7.7 percent.  One alternative interpretation of the slope coefficient in the 1940 regression is that the relevant
rate of return on investments in high rent markets is higher.
18 In 1970, about 4% of owner-occupied housing units have topcoded value observations.  This topcoding
most likely biases the rent coefficient downward; omission of topcoded observations from the sample results in
lower coefficient estimates.
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is the logarithm of the owner’s self-reported estimate of the unit’s market value.
14  The independent
variable of primary interest is the logarithm of median rent in the housing market.
15 In this and all
subsequent analyses, metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) will serve as a proxy for a housing
market area.
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The estimation is hampered to some extent by the absence of data on housing structural
characteristics in the 1940 Census.  For purposes of comparing results in 1940 and later years, Table
3 reports the results of 1970 specifications constrained to match the data limitations in 1940.  Simple
univariate regressions of log housing values on log median rents, reported in the table’s first and
third columns, show a relationship that increases in magnitude between 1940 and 1970.
17  The point
estimate in the first column suggests that metropolitan areas with higher rents in 1940 had less-than-
proportionately higher values.  The 1970 point estimate suggests the reverse, that ratios of value to
rent were higher in high-rent markets.
18  While suggestive, it should be noted that neither of these19The 1940 IPUMS data lack information necessary to construct this data; omission of this variable from
the 1970 regressions does not alter the results.
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coefficients can be statistically distinguished from one, and they are not significantly different from
each other.
The ideal source of variation in median rents for this exercise would be exogenous
differences across markets in terms of local amenities or opportunity costs of supplying housing
units.  The median rent data used here might confound this type of variation with that arising from
characteristics of a metropolitan area’s residents, most notably their income levels.  To more
effectively isolate location-based variation in median rents, the remaining regressions in Table 3
control for a basic set of housing market characteristics, including householders’ median age, the
fraction of householders working in manufacturing industries, the fraction of householders with a
college education, and Census region effects.  The 1970 regression also includes a measure of recent
housing supply growth, the fraction of all housing units built after 1960, to account for the
possibility that supply responses may have differentially closed gaps in rents and values across
housing markets.
19 
Controlling for housing market characteristics, the relationship between rents and values
across housing markets in 1940 weakens considerably.  For every 1 percent increase in median rents,
predicted owner-occupied housing values increase by roughly 0.3 percent.  A very different pattern
emerges in 1970: the effect of a 1 percent increase in median rent is statistically indistiguishable
from a 1 percent increase in values.  The 1940 coefficient is significantly less than one and
significantly different from the 1970 coefficient.  This pattern corresponds exactly to the model’s
predictions: in a liquidity-constrained world, housing values in high-rent areas are discounted; when20 An alternative explanation for the patterns in Table 3 focuses on cyclical effects.  Since housing values
should reflect the present discounted value of rents, rents should display more cyclical volatility than values.  In
recessions, the ratio of values to rents should be higher; in expansionary periods the ratio should be lower. 
According to the National Bureau of Economic Research, the 1940 Census was taken nearly two years into a seven
year-long expansion, while the 1970 Census was taken in the midst of a nearly year-long recession.  Note, however,
that a universal reduction in the ratio of values to rents should alter the intercept term of these regressions, not the
coefficient on median rent.  The median rent coefficient would change only if recessions differentially affect the
ratio of values to rents in high-rent markets.
21 Added structural characteristics include categorical variables for number of rooms, year structure built,
presence of basement, number of units in structure (rental units only), whether unit is detached (owner-occupied
units only), number of units at address (rental units only), number of bathrooms, and presence of window or central
air conditioning.
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the constraints are relaxed these discounts disappear.
20
The ideal source of variation in median rents would also account for differences in the
quality of renter- and owner-occupied housing units across markets.  Unfortunately, it is impossible
to account for these factors using 1940 IPUMS data, since they contain no information on housing
unit structural characteristics.  In 1970, however, it is possible to perform such an exercise; the fifth
regression in Table 3 presents the results.  In this regression, the median rent variable for each
metropolitan area has been replaced with each area’s mean residual from a regression of ln(median
rent) on a basic set of structural characteristics.
21  This modified rent variable thus accounts for
differences in observed rental unit characteristics across markets.  The same set of structural
characteristics also appear as regressors in the reported specification, though their coefficients are
not reported here.  Controlling for observable differences in housing unit quality has a negligible
effect on the estimated relationship between median rents and housing values.  Comparing the fourth
and fifth regressions in Table 4, the coefficient falls from 1.17 to 1.10, a difference that is not
statistically significant.  On the basis of this evidence, the failure to consistently account for housing
unit quality across markets over time does not appear to influence the basic message reported in
Table 4: that the ratio of housing values to median rents leveled upwards between 1940 and 1970.15
The remaining three regression specifications reported in Table 3 extend the analysis forward
from 1970 to 2000.  Each specification replicates the final 1970 model, which adjust median rents
in each market and controls for structural characteristics, for IPUMS samples derived from 1980,
1990 and 2000 Census data.  As is true in 1970 data, the estimated effect on housing values of a one
percent increase in median rent in 1980 is statistically indistinguishable from one percent.  In 1990
and 2000, estimated coefficients exceed one by a significant margin.  From one perspective, these
larger coefficient estimates coincide with the second, post-1980 period of mortgage market
innovation that further relaxed borrowing constraints for a broad segment of the population.  The
results imply, however, that the ratio of value to rents is now higher in high-rent cities, a pattern that
cannot be explained with the simple model outlined in the preceding section. There are several
possible explanations for this finding.  Higher relative values in high rent markets could reflect
divergent expectations about future rent levels: consumers may now expect the fastest rent increases
in the markets with highest current rent.  Alternatively, borrowing constraints may now pose the
greatest limitation for consumers in low rent markets.  Finally, unobserved components of housing
quality could be increasing most rapidly in the owner-occupied housing stock within high-rent
MSAs.
Overall, the time series evidence can be regarded as suggestive but far from definitive.  The
escalation of owner-occupied housing values in high rent markets is consistent with the pattern
expected with relaxed borrowing constraints, but it is clear that access to credit cannot by itself
explain all of the evidence shown in Table 3.
V. Repeated cross-sectional evidence: the VA mortgage program22 Summary statistics for all reported regression covariates appear in Appendix Table A1.
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A. Did the VA mortgage program influence housing tenure?
The empirical tests of the relationship between liquidity constraints and prices presented
below rely on the presumption that a readily identifiable group, war veterans, had significantly
greater access to credit than otherwise identical householders in 1970.  Given the plethora of
mortgage market innovations that drove the postwar boom in home ownership, it is not inherently
clear that the advantaged conferred by the VA mortgage program was significant.  The probit
specifications presented in Table 4 address this concern by looking for evidence that veterans’
greater access to credit translated into higher probabilities of home ownership.
These ownership probits use data on householders derived from the same IPUMS samples
used in the preceding section.  Coefficients reported in the table indicate the marginal effect of a
one-unit change in the independent variable when all other variables are set equal to their respective
means.
22  
Table 4 first addresses the concern that veteran status might be a poor proxy variable for
access to credit.  Such a concern would be valid if veterans had greater (or lesser) demand for
owner-occupied housing for other unobserved reasons.  To test the validity of these concerns, the
first specification examines home ownership in 1940, prior to the implementation of the VA
mortgage program.  While ownership is significantly more common among households headed by
older, married, male, non-black, and native-born individuals, and varies significantly by household
size and region, there is no evidence to suggest that veterans were either more or less likely to own
a home than otherwise identical householders.
A comparable probit specification for 1970, reported in the second column, distinguishes23 Only veterans who served after 1941 are eligible for the VA mortgage program.  The IPUMS data does
not explicitly list dates of service, but rather identifies whether veterans served in a particular war (World War I,
World War II, Korea or Vietnam) or in peacetime only.  I count all veterans with service in World War II, Korea or
Vietnam as eligible for the program.  Moreover, I also include veterans serving in peacetime only who were under
the age of 50 in 1970.  The age distribution of peacetime-only veterans in the 1970 IPUMS sample is bimodal, with a
local minimum occurring at age 50.  In 1970, the VA mortgage benefit was also restricted to veterans who had
served for at least 90 days.  Unfortunately, the IPUMS data do not indicate a veteran’s length of service.  Thus the
measure employed here likely misidentifies some ineligible veterans as eligible.
24 A pooled specification, which allows a difference-in-difference style estimation of the impact of VA
mortgage program eligibility, shows a statistically significant 13.5 percentage point marginal effect.  As noted in
Collins and Margo (2001), caution should be used in interpreting this result since the estimated coefficients on many
householder characteristics change considerably across the 1940 and 1970 samples.
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veterans by their projected eligibility for the VA mortgage program.
23  Ineligible veterans, similar
to all veterans in 1940, have home ownership patterns statistically indistinguishable from otherwise
identical householders.  Eligible veterans, on the other hand, are significantly more likely to own
their home.  When all other variables are evaluated at their means, the magnitude of the veteran
effect is 7.6 percentage points.  Eligibility for the VA mortgage program thus confers an advantage
comparable to a one-standard deviation increase in wage and salary income, or two additional years
of age.  Given that 43% of householders were eligible veterans in 1970, these results suggest that
about 20% of the overall increase in home ownership rates between 1940 and 1970 can be attributed
to the VA mortgage program.
24
The final three specifications in Table 4 replicate the 1970 specification using later IPUMS
samples.  Eligibility for the VA mortgage program continues to exert a significant positive influence
on the probability of home ownership in 1980, though the point estimate is only slightly more than
half the size of the 1970 coefficient.  In 1990 and 2000, eligibility for a VA mortgage ceases to be
a significant predictor of home ownership.  Given the degree of innovation in mortgage instruments
beginning in the 1980s, this pattern is not surprising.  This evidence suggests that veteran status can
be used as a proxy for easier access to credit within a relatively narrow time window in the post-25 As in Table 3, the unit of observation is the owner-occupied housing unit.  Standard errors have been
adjusted to reflect clustering of these observations by metropolitan area.  Only veterans eligible for the VA mortgage
program are used in calculating the veterans’ share variable for 1970.  Using the procedure for predicting eligibility
described above, over 97% of veteran heads of household were eligible for the mortgage program in 1970.
26 Exclusion of the housing market characteristic variables changes the magnitudes of some coefficients in
Table 5, but does not influence their statistical significance.
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World War II era.
B. Using veteran status as a proxy for access to credit
Across housing markets, the fraction of households headed by an individual eligible for the
VA mortgage program varied significantly, from approximately one-fourth to one-half in 1970.  The
regression results presented in Table 5 use the density of veterans in a metropolitan area as a proxy
for the extent of borrowing constraint relaxation in that area.  Theoretically, the escalation of value-
to-rent ratios in high rent markets should be more acute among markets with a high density of
veterans.  The independent variable of interest in these regressions is therefore the interaction
between veteran density and the logarithm of median rent.
25  Each regression also includes the main
effects of median rent and veteran density, as well as the set of housing market characteristic
controls introduced in Table 3.
26  The central assumption underlying this strategy is that veteran
status does not correlate with the unobserved component of demand for owner-occupied housing.
The best available evidence to support this assumption appears in Table 4, which shows that veteran
status is associated with higher home ownership rates only in the years when the VA mortgage
program presented a distinct advantage over other readily available credit programs.  Table 6 below
will provide further evidence in support of this assumption.
The first regression reported in Table 5 predicts housing values as a function solely of19
housing market characteristics, including median rent and veteran density but excluding the
interaction between these variables.  The impact of a one percent increase in median rents on
housing values is statistically indistinguishable from a one percent increase.  Markets with a higher
share of veterans feature higher housing values, other things equal.  Among the eight other market
characteristics controlled for in this specification, only householder education levels and location
in the Southern Census region have a significant impact on housing values.  Owner-occupied
housing costs more in relatively educated markets, and less in the South.
This first regression supports the hypothesis that veterans, by virtue of their superior access
to credit, have the potential to prop up housing values in markets where they form a sizable group.
However, this result also supports the simpler hypothesis that veterans simply consume more or
better housing.  The remaining regressions in Table 5 evaluate which explanation is most plausible.
The second specification introduces the interaction term between veteran density and the
logarithm of median rent.  The presence of householders with easier access to credit should matter
less in low-rent markets, where few consumers were likely to be liquidity constrained in the first
place.  Consistent with this prediction, the interaction between veteran density and median rent is
significant and positive, while the two main effects are significant and negative.  The results imply
that the relationship between median rents and housing values is weakest in markets with a relatively
low veteran density; point estimates suggest that discounts for owner-occupied housing in high rent
markets disappear once the veteran share exceeds roughly 41%.  The point estimates also imply that
veteran density predicts higher absolute housing values only in markets with median rents close to
the observed maximum value in 1970.  Introducing the interaction term also increases the magnitude
and significance of several other covariates in the regression: the Western Census region now20
appears pricier than all others, areas with faster recent housing supply growth tend to have lower
prices, and prices tend to be higher in manufacturing-oriented metropolitan areas.
The third and fourth columns in Table 5 present the results of specifications that incorporate
controls for structural characteristics.  As in Table 3, structural characteristics are both incorporated
as explanatory variables and used to transform the median rent variable into a constant-quality
measure of rental unit prices.  These controls improve the fit of the model considerably, raising the
R
2 measures from about 0.16 to 0.54.
With structural controls, and omitting the interaction between veteran density and median
rent, there now appears to be a negative relationship between veteran share and housing values.  The
positive coefficient observed in the table’s first specification must, therefore, reflect the tendency
for veterans to gravitate towards markets with larger or higher quality housing units.  The significant
negative coefficient assuages concerns that veterans are concentrated in markets with housing units
of higher unobserved quality.  Rather, it now appears that veterans for the most part congregate in
markets where the price of owner-occupied housing is relatively low.  This finding is consistent with
the results in the preceding column.
The final regression in Table 5 re-introduces the interaction between veteran density and
median rent.  Once again, the interaction term is positive and significant while the two main effects
are negative and significant.  As in the table’s second specification, the link between median rents
and housing values is strongest in markets with a high veteran density.  Unlike that prior
specification, higher veteran density now predicts higher housing values in all markets, rather than
just those with higher rents.
This reduced-form analysis cannot directly provide universal estimates of the elasticity of27 In Table 5, we observe that increases in eligible veterans’ share in low-rent markets have the effect of
lowering housing values.  This effect is present both in 1940 and 1970, suggesting that this pattern has more to do
with nonrandom sorting of veterans than the VA mortgage program itself.  The thought experiment conducted here
starts with the presumption that the VA mortgage program would have no impact on prices in a housing market
where liquidity constraints were not binding initially.
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housing prices with respect to borrowing constraint regulations.  The results can, however, gauge
the impact of extending VA-style access to credit markets to an additional fraction of the population.
Both theory and empirical evidence suggest that this impact varies with the initial extent to which
liquidity constraints are binding.  Suppose a market exists where VA-style mortgage innovations are
superfluous because liquidity constraints are (just barely) not initially binding.  Theoretically, we
would expect to observe no impact on the ratio of values to rents.
27  The results suggest that in a
market with rent levels 10% higher than this unaffected city, extending VA-style mortgage benefits
to an additional 10% of the population would increase the ratio of housing values to rents by about
6%.
Over the past twenty years, further innovations in the mortgage market have afforded a very
large number of households access to borrowing regimes equivalent to, or in many cases more
advantageous than, the VA mortgage program.  Extrapolating from these results, extending VA
borrowing privileges to the 60% of the population that was not eligible (as of 1970) would lead to
value increases of 36% in metropolitan areas where rents exceeded those in a marginally unaffected
city by 10%.  Effects on housing values in low-rent areas, of course, would be decidedly more
muted. Table 1 shows that relative to median rents, median housing values have increased by
roughly 10 to 20 percent since 1970.  While the evidence presented here is insufficient to directly
link recent price increases to mortgage market innovations, the magnitude of the implied effect is
consistent with such a link.28 The 1940 specification more closely resembles the second regression model in Table 5, since structural
characteristic variables are not available in that sample.
29 Point estimates in the 1940 specification indicate that the predicted effect of an increase in veteran
density is always negative, since the minimum value for ln(median rent) is roughly 2.
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C. Assessing the validity of veteran status as a proxy for access to credit
Table 4 indicated that the impact of veteran status on home ownership was most prominent
in 1970, the year examined in the preceding subsection.  In other years, when veteran status
conferred little if any true advantage in access to credit, the results in Table 5 should not be
replicable.  A strong resemblance between regressions using data from other years and those
reported in Table 5 would support the hypothesis that veteran status captures some other
characteristic of a housing market, rather than the density of householders with easy access to credit.
Table 6 displays coefficients drawn from four regression models that mirror the last reported
specification in Table 5, using data from the 1940, 1980, 1990 and 2000 IPUMS samples.
28  In each
of the four data samples, higher veteran densities are associated with lower overall housing values.
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Moreover, none of the four specifications feature a positive interaction term between median rent
and veteran density.  This may be somewhat surprising in the 1980 sample, since Table 4 indicated
that VA mortgage eligibility conferred some advantage in that year.  There are two related
explanations for this finding.  First, the overall density of veterans in the population declined from
roughly 40% to 30% of all householders between 1970 and 1980, which could impact estimates if
the true underlying effects are nonlinear.  Second, veterans as a group were significantly older in
1980 than in 1970.  In 1970, the mean age for veteran householders was 3.6 years lower than for
non-veterans.  By 1980, this pattern had reversed: the mean age of veteran householders was 3.1
years older than non-veterans.  The density of veterans in age cohorts most traditionally associated23
with transitions to home ownership thus declined even more rapidly.
By 2000, the interaction between veteran density and median rent is negative and significant,
indicating that housing now sells at a discount relative to rent levels in markets with a higher share
of veterans.  There are two possible explanations for this finding.  First, the transition from a drafted
to volunteer armed forces may have changed the relationship between veteran status and
socioeconomic status.  Veteran density may therefore mark socioeconomically disadvantaged
markets in later data.  Second, the comparative rarity of veterans in younger age cohorts implies that
markets with higher veteran density may be declining areas where few young families are moving
in.
If veteran density marks poor or declining metropolitan areas in 2000, might the same
variable mark prosperous, growing areas in 1970?  While the regressions in Table 5 control for a
measure of recent growth, the concern that veteran status correlates with unobserved prosperity is
serious enough to warrant additional attention.  Table 7 investigates this concern with three
additional specifications estimated using 1970 IPUMS data.  The first tests to see whether faster-
growing markets, as measured by the fraction of housing units built within the past ten years, have
higher ratios of owner-occupied housing values to rents.  The results indicate that this is not the case.
The interaction between the recent growth variable and median rent is negative and statistically
insignificant.  Including this interaction term has essentially no impact on the significant, positive
interaction between veteran density and median rent.  The second and third specifications divide the
sample evenly into markets that exhibited greater and lesser amounts of growth in the housing stock
between 1960 and 1970.  Within both subsamples, the significant interaction between veteran
density and median rent persists.  In fact, the point estimate is larger and of greater statistical24
significance within the subset of slower-growing metropolitan areas.  Thus, the tendency for housing
values to increase more rapidly with rent increases in markets with a high veteran tendency does not
appear to be attributable to differential growth patterns across metropolitan areas.
VI. Does easy credit harm the poor?
The relaxation of liquidity constraints, by raising prices for durable goods, has the potential
to harm some consumers.  In the case of the mortgage market, where most innovations have
involved reducing the amount of savings necessary to purchase a home, the “harmed” consumers
are those who had sufficient savings to participate in the mortgage market prior to the relaxation.
Are these consumers drawn disproportionately from the upper or lower tails of the socioeconomic
distribution?  Table 8 analyzes this question empirically, analyzing cross-sectional variation in home
ownership as of 1970.  These probit specifications incorporate the same set of householder
characteristics utilized in Table 4, adding the set of market characteristics used in Table 5.  One
additional market characteristic, the standard deviation of the log income distribution in each
market, is added to capture the possibility that income inequality affects home ownership
probabilities.  Two separate variables are used to identify individuals of low socioeconomic status
(SES).  The first indicator is based on householders’ reported occupation, and flags those working
in jobs that are not ... The second is based on householder education, and flags those with no more
than a high school diploma.  Variation across markets in the extent of consumer access to credit is
measured by the share of householders who are veterans eligible for the VA mortgage program.
The coefficient of greatest interest for this exercise is on the interaction between the low SES30 This specification controls for veteran status as a householder characteristic, thus this result is
independent of the fact that veterans themselves have higher home ownership probabilities.
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indicator and veteran density.  In the first specification, which uses the occupational proxy for low
SES, the interaction term is significant and negative, indicating that the gap in home ownership
probabilities between householders of high and low SES is widest in markets with a high density
of veterans.  Note that the probability of home ownership is still higher for all householders in
markets with high veteran density.
30
The second regression model adds additional interaction terms, interacting the low SES
indicator with the two other market characteristics showing a significant relationship with the
probability of home ownership in the first regression: the shares of foreign born and college
educated householders in the metropolitan population.  The interaction between college graduate
share and low SES proves to be statistically significant, indicating that the socioeconomic home
ownership gap is largest in markets with a highly educated population.  This term reduces the
magnitude and significance of the veteran share-low SES interaction.
Results are generally quite similar when the occupational SES proxy is replaced with one
based on education.  The final pair of specifications in Table 8 show that adding interactions
between low SES and college graduate share actually increases the magnitude of the the low SES-
veteran share interaction term, while having no effect on the statistical significance.  In both
specifications, the veteran share-low SES interaction is negative and significant at the 10% level.
Overall, this analysis provides some suggestive evidence that the net impact of relaxing
credit constraints can be regressive.  Of course, the impact of the VA mortgage program on low-SES
home ownership rates might be very different from the impact of a program targeted directly at
lower income households.  Given that very few government- or private-sector mortgage programs26
have any explicit means-tested component, and that such components usually consider measures of
present rather than lifetime wealth, the possibility that recent innovations have hindered rather than
promoted low income home ownership is a genuine concern worth further investigation (Goodman
and Nichols 1997).
VII. Conclusion
Previous research has frequently implicated borrowing constraints as significant obstacles
to home ownership.  This literature, as well as the general literature on liquidity constraints and
consumption, has to a surprising extent ignored the possibility that the relaxation of impediments
to borrowing might have an inflationary effect on prices.  Some authors have argued that elastic
housing supply would dampen any price effects.  This paper has shown, in a simple intertemporal
model, that such an effect can indeed exist, regardless of the overall price elasticity of supply.
Moreover, it has provided empirical evidence, centered around one of the great liquidity constraint-
removing policy programs of the mid-twentieth century, that supports the existence of such an
effect.
The implications of these price effects are quite noteworthy.  The relaxation of borrowing
constraints, by increasing the equilibrium price for durable goods such as housing, reduces the
welfare of some households: those that were net purchasers of housing in the pre-relaxation
equilibrium. In more familiar terms, the type of household that suffers from the relaxation of
borrowing constraints is the type which has already saved for a down payment, only to witness the
elimination of down payment requirements – and a concomitant increase in the price of owner
occupied housing – prior to their purchase.
These results can be interpreted as a caveat to those interested in the policy goal of increasing27
home ownership rates, or rates of ownership of other durable goods.  The relaxation of borrowing
constraints, frequently touted as a central policy tool for achieving this goal, comes with a cost, even
in the absence of borrower default risk.  As theory and the evidence drawn from the VA mortgage
program indicates, easier credit for some can make prices higher for all.28
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Table 1: Housing prices and home ownership rates, 1940-2000
Year Median value Median
monthly
contract rent





1940 $2,750 $20 137.5 43.6%
1950 — — — 55.0
1960 11,250 55 182-227 61.9
1970 16,250 87 172-201 62.9
1980 47,500 195 231-256 64.4
1990 85,000 362 221-249 64.2
2000 112,500 500 200-250 66.2
Note: Median value sample consists of owner-occupied nonfarm single family units,
excluding vacant-for-sale and condominium properties, and properties with commercial uses. 
In 1940, values are for all nonfarm owner-occupied units; owners of multifamily or
commercial-use units were instructed to report only the market value of their own unit. 
Median rent sample uses contract rent observations for all nonfarm rental units with cash rent. 
Ranges reported for ratio of median value to median rent when value data are reported in
intervals only.
Source: IPUMS samples, 1940-2000.  The 1950 IPUMS sample contains no information on
housing values or rents.34
Table 2: Important events in the history of the mortgage market
1920s Typical mortgage lasts 5-10 years, requires at least 30% down payment, and is less
than fully amortized.
1932 250,000 nonfarm foreclosures nationwide.
1933 Home Owners Loan Corporation established, makes fully amortized 20-year loans.
1934 FHA establishes program of insuring against homeowner default on long-term,
fixed-rate loans.  Enables down payments of less than 10% of property value, 25-30
year loan periods with full amortization.  Borrowers pay a mortgage insurance
premium in exchange for coverage.
1938 Fannie Mae established, creates secondary market for mortgage loans that “conform”
to underwriting standards covering borrower creditworthiness and property
characteristics.
1944 Servicemen’s Readjustment Act creates Veterans Administration mortgage insurance
program, which enables qualifying veterans to purchase a home with no down
payment and no mortgage insurance premiums.
1968 Fannie Mae privatized, Ginnie Mae established to fund FHA and VA mortgage
programs.
1970 Freddie Mac established as an additional secondary market conduit.
1982 Beginning of rapid growth in the secondary market for “non-conforming” loans;
mortgages that Fannie Mae and other agencies are unwilling to securitize.
1992 Federal Housing Enterprises Financial Safety and Soundness Act directs Fannie Mae
and Freddie Mac to acquire more loans made to low-income borrowers.  This
directive leads to more flexible terms for “conforming” loans.
1993 $100 billion worth of non-conforming loans securitized in the secondary market.
1994 Establishment of loan programs that allow qualified buyers to borrow up to 125% of
property value.
Sources: Jackson (1985), Bruskin et al. (2000), Listokin et al. (2001), Martinez (2000).35
Table 3: Relationship between median rents and owner-occupied house values, 1940-2000
Dependent variable: ln(value) for owner-occupied units in year:





















— — — — — 
Housing market characteristic
controls?
No Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Median rent adjusted for structural
characteristics?
No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Structural characterstic controls? No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 66,050 66,050 192,581 192,581 192,581 291,624 385,877 309,363
Number of metropolitan areas 137 137 124 124 124 286  297 106
R
2 0.040 .045 0.143 0.153 0.533 0.520 0.615 0.517
Note: Huber-White robust standard errors in parentheses.  Regression observations are weighted by the size of the sample of rental units used
to create the median rent measure.  Sample consists of owner-occupied nonfarm housing units.  In 1940, sample is restricted to units where the
householder is a sample line person; owners of multifamily dwellings were instructed to report only the value of their own dwelling.  In later
years, multifamily dwellings are excluded from the sample.  Housing market characteristic controls include median householder age, percent
of householders who are college-educated, percent of householders in the labor force that work in manufacturing industries, median family
income, region effects, and in 1970-2000, percent of housing units built in the past ten years. Structural characteristic controls include
categorical variables for number of rooms, year structure built, presence of basement, number of units in structure (rental units only), whether
unit is detached (owner-occupied units only), number of units at address (rental units only), number of bathrooms, and presence of window or
central air conditioning.  All coefficients reported in this table are significantly different from zero at the 1% level.36
Table 4: Did the VA mortgage program give veterans an advantage?
Independent Variable
Probit regression results: Dependent variable equal to one if respondent owns home








































































































































N 44,449 279,505 549,888 599,863 491,500
Pseudo-R
2 0.117 0.217 0.252 0.244 0.253
Note: Table entries represent the marginal change in predicted probability associated with a unit change in the
independent variable when all other covariates are set equal to their means.  Veterans designated eligible for VA
mortgages in 1970 are those reporting service in World War II, Korea or Vietnam, or those under 50 reporting
peacetime military service only.  Sample consists of metropolitan area-resident nonfarm householders in the
merged 1940 (sample line persons only), 1970 (Form 2 metro sample), 1980, 1990 and 2000 IPUMS.  All
coefficients in this table except South region in 1940 and Veteran in the first, second, and fifth column are
significantly different from zero at the 0.1% level.37
Table 5: Housing values and the density of veterans in the population, 1970























































































































Median rent adjusted for structural
characteristics?
No No Yes Yes
Structural characteristic controls? No No Yes Yes
N 192,581 192,581 192,581 192,581
R
2 0.160 0.166 0.543 0.548
Note:  Huber-White robust standard errors in parentheses.  Regression observations are weighted by the size
of the sample of rental units used to create the median rent measure.  Sample consists of owner-occupied
nonfarm housing units.  Multifamily dwellings are excluded from the sample.  Housing market characteristic
controls include median householder age, percent of householders who are college-educated, percent of
householders in the labor force that work in manufacturing industries, region effects, and percent of housing
units built in the past ten years. Structural characteristic controls include categorical variables for number of
rooms, year structure built, presence of basement, whether unit is detached, number of bathrooms, and
presence of window or central air conditioning.
*** denotes a coefficient significant at the 1% level, 
** the 5% level, 
* the 10% level.38
Table 6: Housing values and the density of veterans in the population in other years























































































































Median rent adjusted for structural
characteristics?
No Yes Yes Yes
Structural characteristic controls? No Yes Yes Yes
N 66,050 291,624 385,877 309,363
R
2 0.046 0.525 0.621 0.520
Note:  Huber-White robust standard errors in parentheses.  Regression observations are weighted by the size
of the sample of rental units used to create the median rent measure.  Sample consists of owner-occupied
nonfarm housing units.  In 1940, sample is restricted to units where the householder is a sample line person;
owners of multifamily dwellings were instructed to report only the value of their own dwelling.  In later
years, multifamily dwellings are excluded from the sample.  Housing market characteristic controls include
median householder age, percent of householders who are college-educated, percent of householders in the
labor force that work in manufacturing industries, region effects, and after 1940, percent of housing units
built in the past ten years. Structural characteristic controls include categorical variables for number of
rooms, year structure built, presence of basement, whether unit is detached, number of bathrooms, and
presence of window or central air conditioning.
*** denotes a coefficient significant at the 1% level, 
** the 5% level, 
* the 10% level.39


















































Median rent adjusted for structural
characteristics?
Yes Yes Yes
Structural characteristic controls? Yes Yes Yes
N 192,581 76,295 116,286
R
2 0.532 0.596 0.523
Note:  Huber-White robust standard errors in parentheses.  Regression observations are
weighted by the size of the sample of rental units used to create the median rent measure. 
Sample consists of owner-occupied nonfarm single-family housing units in the 1970 IPUMS. 
Additional housing market characteristic controls include median householder age, percent of
householders who are college-educated, percent of householders in the labor force that work
in manufacturing industries, log of median family income, and region effects. Structural
characteristic controls include categorical variables for number of rooms, year structure built,
presence of basement, whether unit is detached, number of bathrooms, and presence of
window or central air conditioning.  High- and low-growth cities are consist of the 62
metropolitan areas with above- and below-average shares of housing built in the past ten
years.  The cutoff point between categories is 27.35%.
*** denotes a coefficient significant at the 1% level, 
** the 5% level, 
* the 10% level.40
Table 8: The distributional impact of selectively relaxing credit constraints
Independent Variable
Dependent Variable: Home ownership indicator
SES Proxy: Occupation SES Proxy: Education











     VA mortgage-eligible veterans as share of





































































     Percent of householders employed in









Interaction of Low SES indicator with
     VA mortgage-eligible veterans as share of






















Additional householder characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 337,675 337,675 337,675 337,675
Pseudo-R
2 0.253 0.253 0.252 0.252
Note: Table entries reflect probit coefficients scaled to indicate marginal impact on predicted probability when
other covariates are set equal to their respective means.  Standard errors, corrected for grouped observations, in
parentheses.  Observations are weighted by the number of observations used to calculate the market characteristic
variables.  Additional householder characteristics include age, age squared, whether married, whether female,
whether black, whether foreign born, logarithm of household income, household size , and whether a VA
mortgage-eligible veteran.  Data source: IPUMS.
** denotes a coefficient significant at the 1% level, 
* the 5% level.41


































Owner-occupied nonfarm dwelling space rent index (Logarithmic, 1947=0)
Personal consumption expenditures price index (Logarithmic, 1947=0)42
Table A1: Summary statistics for regression covariates
1940 1970
Variable N mean std. dev. minimum maximum N mean std. dev. minimum maximum
Householder owns home 44,449 0.303 — — — 279,505 0.569 — — —
Age 44,449 42.701 12.468 15 100 279,505 42.629 13.636 14 100
Married 44,449 0.779 — —  —  279,505 0.756 — — —
Female 44,449 0.139 — —  —  279,505 0.160 — — —
Black 44,449 0.081 — —  —  279,505 0.107 — — —
Foreign Born 44,449 0.198 —  —  —  279,505 0.085 — — —
ln(wage and salary income) 44,449 6.991 0.849 0.000 8.517 279,505 8.809 0.873 3.912 10.820
Household size 44,449 2.820 1.547 1 29 279,505 3.316 1.785 1 26
Veteran 44,449 0.091 — —  —  279,505 0.463 — — —
Veteran eligible for VA
mortgage
44,449 0.000 — —  —  279,505 0.452 — — —
ln(owner-occupied housing
unit value)
66,050 8.046 0.918 0.000 11.362 192,581 9.844 0.584 7.824 10.820
ln(median rent) 137 2.923 0.315 2.079 3.689 124 4.446 0.235 3.912 4.942
Veterans’ share 137 0.080 0.026 0.017 0.170 124 0.416 0.033 0.283 0.508